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Abstract
Research and development (R&D) collaborations are
horizontal agreements among firms to join forces in
their inventive activities. As in the context of the re-
cent COVID-19 global pandemic, such collaborations
are often promoted with an argument of increased R&D
productivity. In numerous contexts, especially when
marginal production costs are low, such as for medi-
cations or for software, the consumers’ surplus depends
critically on the best-performing product available on
the market, for—all else equal—this product will tend
to take a dominant position. Using a simple two-stage
model of innovation and subsequent product commer-
cialization on a market with heterogeneous consumers,
we show that a noncollaborative patent race with patent
protection (for the best product) provides strong inno-
vation incentives, leading to better performing prod-
ucts than a regime of noncollaborative research with-
out patent protection or of collaborative research (with
profit sharing).
1 Introduction
Collaborative research is en vogue, and has even become
a public necessity. In the face of the recent COVID-
19 global pandemic governments called on industry to
unite so as to produce a vaccine in the shortest possi-
ble timeframe. Clearly, in the case of an infectious dis-
ease with the potential to cripple the global economy,
the quality of a vaccine the “great coronavirus collabo-
ration” [9] may come up with is of utmost importance.
Since when searching for alternatives the expected best-
performance alternative increases with the aggregate ef-
fort put into the venture, it is important that incentives
are such that the economic agents participating in the
research have maximal incentives to exert effort. Given
that the cost of experimentation does not vary much as
a function of R&D participation (at least in the short-
run), our pursuit here is to track the economic incentives
when experimentation occurs in a group or individually,
by keeping in mind that the performance of the product
is key for consumer surplus (at a given price).
1.1 Literature
The classical understanding by Schumpeter [20] is that
a firm’s role is to develop production methods to satisfy
its consumers’ demand. The neoclassical view of R&D,
as summarized by Nelson [17], purports that firms need
to obtain intellectual property rights to be able to appro-
priate the benefits of their research, thus resulting in a
winner-takes-all patent race.1 The supra-normal rents
from successful inventions provide in turn strong incen-
tives to invest in inventive activities.2 Since firms may
for various reasons not be able to by themselves exploit
many of the inventions they make [21], incentives arise
for them to share or license their new technologies as
part of what eventually becomes collaborative innova-
tion.3 Indeed, Allen [1] proposes that in addition to
public institutions, private firms, and individual inven-
tors, there is a fourth source of new inventions which he
terms the “collective invention” that results from close
contacts, voluntary disclosure, and imitation of work
practices. Instead of unintended knowledge dissipation,
these spillovers may be desirable, as they might reduce
the collective experimentation cost. Collaborative in-
novation is therefore not an accidental byproduct, but
rather operationalized intentionally, by means of coop-
erative R&D agreements or cross-licensing deals among
1See, e.g., Reinganum [18] for a summary of classical results on the dynamics of innovation competition.
2These investments may sometimes even exceed the socially optimal amount of R&D expenditures; see Prop. 10 (i).
3Foray [11, Ch. 3] mentions further reasons for R&D collaboration, such as cost sharing, avoidance of redundancies, economies of spe-
cialization, as well as the need for reducing uncertainties associated with modular subsystems—best accomplished across firm boundaries. In
addition, especially small firms may benefit from knowledge complementarities that arise in physical proximity to other firms and institutions
in the same geographical area [8], while other firms may overcome distance barriers by mobility and alliance formation [19].
4The logic advanced here is motivated by the cooperation that can arise in a repeated stage game (such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [2]), due
to the folk theorem [12, 13]. Yet even in a one-time interaction, the Coase theorem points to the possibility of Pareto-optimal outcomes in the
presence of complete information and well-defined property rights [6].





different firms that may be otherwise competing [14].4
Collaboration on innovation works particularly well
with modular systems where design problems can be
isolated and individual contributions integrated into the
full system, thus allowing for economies of specializa-
tion [3]; see also footnote 3. There is empirical evi-
dence that external collaboration incentives (as part of
a government program) may induce improvements in
innovative performance, for example, in Germany [7].
Finally, by extending the notion of research partners to
users and other semi-interested parties, collaborative in-
novation takes on the meaning of “open innovation” (a
term coined by Chesbrough [5]), arguably leading to a
paradigm shift in the procurement of new ideas [4] and a
“commercialization” of external resources [23] with its
own processes and infrastructure [10].
1.2 Research Question
Standing on the shoulders of giants (represented by the
extant literature), our goal in this paper is quite modest.
Using a simple, and arguably neoclassical, model we ask
whether collaborative research makes sense from the
point of view of joint experimentation, without resort-
ing to additional “out-of-the-box” qualitative arguments
to justify cooperation (such as those in footnote 3). This
echoes the critique by Mowery [15] voiced more than
two decades ago, that despite a proliferation of research
collaborations (in his analysis at the industry-university
interface), only a moderate success is visible—a phe-
nomenon that is driven at least in part by self-interest
(e.g., universities’ potentially over-emphasizing their
participation in the intellectual property rights derived
from joint innovations).
1.3 Contribution
As emphasized in neoclassical economics, the self-
interest of economic agents (in the absence of psycho-
logical biases and bounded rationality) is a reliable pre-
dictor for their behavior. The model for inventive ac-
tivity we employ here is that of sequential search for
the most beneficial alternative, in the spirit of Weitzman
[22]. Firms need to address heterogeneous market needs
and therefore compete on quality and price, whereby the
top-performing product (in terms of its quality) may or
may not be eligible for intellectual property protection.
Our simple finding is that by and large, there are no eco-
nomic incentives for collaborative innovation unless in-
tellectual property regimes are weak and experimenta-
tion costs are neither too small nor too large. In par-
ticular, when the best technology can be independently
evaluated as such and patented, research competition is
“healthy” in the sense that it provides the strongest inno-
vation incentives, which for large experimentation costs
results in R&D activity that falls short of the socially op-
timal levels of experimentation, yet is prone to exceed
the latter when the cost of experimentation is small.
1.4 Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. 2 describes the basic setup of the two-period model,
including sequential experimentation by firms in the in-
novation phase and their pricing decisions in the com-
mercialization phase. We derive the equilibria in various
noncooperative settings (with and without patent protec-
tion), as well as in a collaborative setting. In Sec. 3, we
examine the social planner’s most preferred outcome,
which leads to a comparison of all regimes in Sec. 4.
Finally, Sec. 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, that at time t = 0 (“in-
novation phase”) can invest in conducting experiments.
At time t = 1, the firms set prices so as to sell their in-
novations to consumers with heterogeneous preferences
(“commercialization phase”); see Fig. 1.
In the innovation phase, firm i’s product quality qi
is determined by the outcome of the best of ni exper-
iments, for i ∈ {1, 2}. The random outcomes of the
experiments are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) uniformly on the (normalized) quality spaceQ =
[0, 1]. Higher outcomes indicate a better quality (e.g.,
in terms of treatment benefit for a cure, or performance
for a durable good such as software). The cost of each
experiment is c > 0. An “experiment” consists of a
discrete research and development (R&D) effort, which
could amount to a test configuration, a prototype, or any
other costly effort that would determine the likely prod-
uct quality in the event of commercialization.5
Figure 1: Timeline.
In the commercialization phase (i.e., at time t = 1),
the firms set prices so as to maximize their respective
profits from selling the imperfectly substitutable prod-
ucts to a heterogeneous consumer base.6 Each consumer
5The quality itself may be random, in which case qi represents the expected performance value.
6The products are imperfectly substitutable because their qualities (i.e., performance characteristics) are generically different. Indeed, the
probability for the two firms’ products to exhibit equivalent performance characteristics (i.e., q1 = q2) is zero.
7In this widely used linear utility representation u, the consumer’s type θ can be considered as his marginal utility for quality [16].
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of type θ has utility u(pi, qi; θ) = θqi − pi if he buys a
good of quality qi and price pi, otherwise his utility is
zero.7 Consumer types θ are uniformly distributed on
the (normalized) type space Θ = [0, 1], and the total
number of consumers is normalized to one. Assume that
the marginal cost of producing a good is zero. This as-
sumption serves to simplify the analysis and holds to a
very good approximation for products whose total costs
are mainly frontloaded by the required R&D expendi-
tures, but that are relatively cheap to produce (at a small
marginal cost) in the commercialization phase, such as
pharmaceuticals or computer software.
The innovation phase and the commercialization
phase are now discussed in turn, starting with the lat-
ter.
2.1 Product Commercialization
The firms’ best experimental outcomes define their
respective quality levels, q1 and q2. Let qH =
max{q1, q2} be the quality of the “flagship” top per-
former and qL = min{q1, q2} be the “generic” runner-
up quality. The heterogeneous quality levels offered
on the product market, together with the firms’ chosen
price levels, pH and pL, segment the consumer base.
Proposition 1. Given the qualities qH , qL (with 0 <
qL < qH ≤ 1) and prices pH , pL (with 0 ≤ pL <
pH ≤ 1), consumers with types in ΘH = [θ1, 1] pur-
chase the flagship product (of quality qH ), those with
types in ΘL = [θ0, θ1] purchase the generic product
(of quality qL), and the remaining consumers with types
in Θ0 = [0, θ0] do not purchase at all, where θ0 =
pL/qL ∈ Θ0 ∩ ΘL and θ1 = (pH − pL)/(qH − qL) ∈
ΘL ∩ΘH are “marginal” types.8
Proof. Let firmH be the firm offering the flagship prod-
uct of quality qH and firm L be the firm offering the
generic product of quality qL. The marginal consumer
who is indifferent between choosing the product of qual-
ity qH and the product of quality qL is therefore of
type θ1 such that u(pH , qH ; θ1) = u(pL, qL; θ1), so
θ1 = (pH − pL)/(qH − qL) as claimed. Similarly,
the marginal consumer indifferent between purchasing
nothing and buying the generic product is such that
0 = u(0, 0; θ0) = u(pL, qL; θ0), whence θ0 = pL/qL,
which concludes our proof.
The market segments (see Fig. 2) imply the firms’
profits as a function of their pricing decisions, which
in turn allows them to anticipate each other’s best re-
sponses. The intersection of the firms’ best responses
to the opponents’ price choices yields a unique Nash-
equilibrium strategy profile. The resulting equilibrium
prices p∗H and p
∗
L, which depend on the realized per-
formance levels qH and qL, can be considered as a
fairly robust prediction of market prices at the product-
commercialization stage.
Figure 2: Market segments with demands DH , DL.











given the realized qualities qL, qH (with 0 ≤ qL <
qH ≤ 1).
Proof. Given the market segments in Prop. 1 (defined
by θ0 and θ1), firm H’s profit is ΠH = (1− θ1)pH and
firm L’s profit is ΠL = (θ1 − θ0)pL. Thus, the firms’
best-response functions are
bH(pL) =
(qH − qL) + pL
2



















Proposition 3. The firms’ Nash-equilibrium profits are




8Marginal types are indifferent between two purchase decisions; their overall likelihood of occurrence in the type space Θ vanishes.
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and




at time t = 1, given the realized qualities qL, qH (with
0 ≤ qL < qH ≤ 1).
Proof. The marginal consumers in equilibrium (denoted
by θ0 = θ∗0 and θ1 = θ
∗
1) are obtained by combining the










This implies the given expressions for the firms’ equi-
librium profits at time t = 1.
Remark 1. The firms’ pricing decisions are strategic
complements, as their best-response functions (see bH
and bL in the proof of Prop. 2) are increasing: each
firm prefers to set a higher price as the other firm in-
creases its price. As a result, there would be an advan-
tage to move second when choosing a price. That is,
the ability to commit to a price before the other firm
is not desirable in this price-setting game. Each firm
would want to adjust its price after the other firm has
moved. Hence, the Nash-equilibrium outcome of the
simultaneous-move game as given in the previous re-
sults can be considered as fairly robust with respect to
additional strategic actions the firms might take in order
to influence the pricing decisions. Here, given the Nash-
equilibrium prices p∗H and p
∗
L, no firm has a unilateral
incentive to change its price.
2.2 Noncooperative Innovation
To determine the level of innovation in a noncoopera-
tive setting we need to answer the question of how many
experiments n∗(c) would each firm want to conduct at
time t = 0 in equilibrium? The answer generally de-
pends on whether the firm with the higher-performance
product can claim patent protection and exercise the
right to exclude the other firm, thus effectively limiting
qL to zero.9
The probability that the outcome of the best of n ex-
periments does not exceed x ∈ [0, 1] is xn. Thus, if
firm j conducts ν experiments and firm i 6= j conducts n
experiments, the probability of firm i winning the inno-
vation race with a higher-quality product is



































or, more simply put:
Π̄∗i =
n
4(n+ ν + 1)
− cn.
Proposition 4. With patent protection, each firm i ∈












Proof. Maximizing Π̄∗i with respect to n leads to the
first-order necessary optimality condition
ν + 1
4(n+ ν + 1)2
− c = 0,
and, similarly, maximizing Π̄∗j with respect to ν leads to
the first-order necessary optimality condition
n+ 1
4(n+ ν + 1)2
− c = 0,
provided c is small enough (so as to allow for a nonneg-
ative solution). The symmetric solution to the preceding
two equations (including the possibility of a corner so-
lution with zero innovation),













for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, constitutes the unique Nash
equilibrium of the firms’ simultaneous-move “innova-
tion game.”





xn−1yν−1π∗(x, y) d(x, y)− cn,
where the commercialization profits, as a function of the
realized performance tuple (x, y), is 12
π∗(x, y) = Π∗H(x, y)1{x>y} + Π
∗
L(y, x)1{x≤y},
and where 1{·} denotes the indicator function.
9Instead of forcing qL = 0, an alternative modeling scenario might limit the low quality qL to a positive value, representing the quality of
a freely available generic product, somewhat reducing the incentives to win the patent race for the innovators.
10Here we use the fact that by Prop. 3, Π∗H(x, 0) = x/4 and Π
∗
L(y, 0) = 0, for all (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]
2.
11For any real number α, the expression [α]+ , max{0, α} denotes the positive part of α.
12The definition of π∗ along the diagonal x = y of the square [0, 1]2 does not affect the value of Π̂∗i .
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Proposition 5. Without patent protection, each firm












Proof. Maximizing firm i’s expected commercializa-
tion payoff Π̂∗i with respect to n, leads to the first-order
optimality condition (satisfied at any interior optimum








where we have (by symmetry) replaced ν with n̂∗i (c).
This condition is equivalent to the claimed relation. The
relation in footnote 13 is obtained from that same condi-
tion by separating n̂∗i (c) from the integral expressions as
much as possible, leading to a quadratic equation.
There are two conflicting effects when comparing
the situation without patent protection to the situation
with patent protection: without patent protection, condi-
tional on obtaining the better product a firm’s expected
payoffs are lower, and conditional on losing the innova-
tion race the firm’s expected payoffs are higher. In ei-
ther case, the value of winning the patent race decreases.
Thus, one could expect a decrease in the equilibrium
experimentation levels which are then closer to socially
optimal levels. All else equal, the firms ex post prefer
to have patent protection for the best innovation. This
regime clearly provides strong incentives for private-
sector inventive activity.
2.3 Collaborative Innovation
If the firms cooperate at the R&D stage and run their ex-
periments jointly based on a profit-sharing agreement,
what would be the optimal number of experiments to
run? To answer this question, we assume that the firms
maximize joint profits, which would be the case regard-
less of patent protection.14
Proposition 6. Given the qualities qH , qL (with 0 <
qL < qH ≤ 1), the firms’ joint profit is maximized at
the “collaborative” price levels p∗∗H = qH/2 and p
∗∗
L =
qL/2 for the flagship product and the generic product,
respectively. The firms’ optimal collaborative profit is
Π∗∗(qL, qH) = qH/4.
Proof. Note first that the firms’ joint profit is
Π = ΠH + ΠL = (1− θ1) pH + (θ1 − θ0) pL,
with the marginal types θ0, θ1 defining the market seg-
ments as in Prop. 1. To maximize Π with respect to the


















By the joint concavity of Π with respect to (pH , pL),15
the preceding optimality conditions yield the unique
maximizer (p∗∗H , p
∗∗
L ) as specified. The collaborative
joint profit obtains by substituting the optimal collab-
orative prices in the firms’ joint profit Π.
Prop. 6 implies the marginal consumer types θ∗∗0 =
1/2 and θ∗∗1 = 1/2. In other words, when acting jointly
it is best for the firms to restrict product variety and com-
mercialize only the top-performance flagship product.
This determines the incentives for the firms’ collabora-
tive inventive activity.












for all c > 0.
Proof. Given the firms’ optimal collaborative
profit Π∗∗(x, y) = x/4 in Prop. 6 for a flagship quality
x ∈ [0, 1], the optimal number n∗∗(c) of joint experi-
ments maximizes their expected payoff at the beginning
of the innovation phase:










The preceding optimization problem is equivalent to








The solution can easily be obtained in closed form and
is as specified in Prop. 7.
The firms’ inventive activity is positive if and only
if the (positive) cost of experimentation is sufficiently
small, so c < 1/4.




/2Bi, where Ai ,
∫
[0,1]2 (xy)




n̂∗i (c)−1π∗(x, y) ln(x) d(x, y) depend on n̂∗i (c) > 0, defining a fixed-point problem, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
14Intellectual property protection for the group of firms could be obtained in the form of a joint patent, or suitable cross-licensing agreements
may be put in place. None of the internal transfer agreements that may exist would a priori impact the firms’ joint profit expectations.
15The trace of the Hessian is negative (equal to−2(1+(qH/qL))/(qH −qL)) and its determinant is positive (equal to 4/((qH −qL)qL)),
indicating that both of its eigenvalues must be negative, thus establishing joint concavity of Π in (pH , pL).
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3 Benchmark: Social Optimality
Given that the firms’ production cost is negligible com-
pared to the product pricing, the social welfare amounts
simply to the gross consumer surplus, as the monetary
transfers between consumers and companies are irrele-
vant for the sum of benefits in the economy. Thus, given
the qualities qH , qL (with 0 < qL < qH ≤ 1) total wel-
fare is
W (qH , qL) = qH
∫ 1
θ1




where the marginal types θ0, θ1 determine the demand
segments and are given in Prop. 1.
3.1 First-Best Pricing
While the magnitude of the monetary transfers from
consumers to producers does not affect the welfare in
the economy, the overall price and performance lev-
els does affect the consumers’ gross surplus and thus
also the social planner’s objective function. A socially
optimal commercialization strategy would apply “first-
best” (i.e., welfare-maximizing) prices pFBH(qH , qL) and
pFBL(qH , qL).





independent of the realized qualities.
Proof. Clearly, the gross consumer surplus is maxi-
mal if all consumers on the market consume the top-
performance product of quality qH . This outcome can
be implemented if θ0 = θ1 = 0, which holds when both
prices vanish.
This implies W FB = qH/2. Since marginal produc-
tion costs are approximately zero (by hypothesis), it is
not surprising that the welfare-maximizing prices in the
product commercialization phase are also zero. How-
ever, such prices would not allow the firms to make up
their innovation cost, and in fact altogether destroy their
incentives to create new products, as any positive R&D
expenditures could not be recouped.
3.2 First-Best Experimentation
Given the implementation of a social optimum in the
commercialization phase, effectively maximizing gross
consumer surplus, the question arises as to a social plan-
ner’s incentives for innovation.










for all c > 0.
Proof. Since for any realized flagship quality x ∈ [0, 1],
the optimal social welfare is W FB = x/2, analogous to





















which implies the given closed-form expression, for
all c > 0.
The firms’ rent-seeking behavior, when they use ex-
perimentation to obtain an advantage in the product mar-
ket, leads to socially inefficiently high innovation. In
other words, many high-technology products may not
be the result of the firms’ responsiveness to real con-
sumer needs but rather a consequence of a patent race
that promises each firm a chance of obtaining supra-
normal rents.
4 Comparison
In the noncooperative regime, let n∗(c) = n∗1(c)+n
∗
2(c)
be the firms’ inventive activity with patent protection
(see Prop. 4), and let n̂∗(c) = n̂∗1(c) + n̂
∗
2(c) denote
their inventive activity without patent protection (see
Prop. 5). When the firms collaborate, their joint inven-
tive activity is n∗∗(c) (see Prop. 7), and finally, the so-
cially optimal (or first-best) inventive activity is given
by nFB(c) (see Prop. 9). The expected top-performance
product quality in the market is strictly monotonic in the
total experimentation the firms carry out. The latter cor-
responds to their joint inventive activity in each of the
four different regimes.
Proposition 10. (i) (c − c0) (nFB(c)− n∗(c)) > 0,
for all c ∈ (0, 1/2) \ {c0} where c0 = 1/18.
(ii) min{nFB(c), n∗∗(c)} > max{n̂∗(c), n∗∗(c)}, for all
c ∈ (0, 1/4). (iii) n∗∗(c) > n̂∗(c) if any only if c ∈
(0, c1) ∪ (c2, 1/4), where c1 ≈ 0.002 and c2 ≈ 0.086.
Proof. (i) From Prop. 4 and Prop. 9 we obtain that
















which (for c ∈ (0, 1/2)) is equivalent to:




Parts (ii) and (iii) follow from an exhaustive numerical
inspection.
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Prop. 10 states that the socially optimal inventive
activity exceeds the privately optimal inventive activity
for larger values of the experimentation cost (i.e., when
c > 1/18); see Fig. 3. Otherwise, private firms with
patent protection invest more in research and develop-
ment than what may be socially optimal, but the quality
outcomes in that case are the highest. Furthermore, the
result implies that collaborative inventive activity with
patent protection is (when nonzero) always smaller than
noncollaborative inventive activity with patent protec-
tion. It is even smaller than noncollaborative inventive
activity without patent protection for small experimen-
tation costs (i.e., c < c1 ≈ 0.002) and for larger experi-
mentation costs (i.e., c > c2 ≈ 0.086); see Fig. 4.
Figure 3: Comparison of the inventive activity under
competition (with and without patent protection), col-
laboration, and from a social planner’s perspective, as a
function of experimentation cost.
Figure 4: Comparison of the expected top-performance
quality under competition (with and without patent pro-
tection), collaboration, and from a social planner’s per-
spective, as a function of experimentation cost.
5 Conclusion
Using a simple two-stage model we have shown that
short of a social planner imposing a welfare-maximizing
solution, noncooperative research with patent protection
of the best-performing invention leads to the strongest
R&D incentives, and thus also to the best expected out-
put in terms of product quality. When experimentation
costs are sufficiently small, the resulting private incen-
tives lead to inventive activity that exceeds the socially
optimal efforts, which in turn implies exceedingly high-
quality products. It is important to note that in reaching
these findings we have excluded all the standard out-of-
the-box explanations, which must therefore be essen-
tial to obtain an economically grounded rationale for
collaborative research. For example, if collaboration
can reduce the cost of experimentation (e.g., through
economies of specialization with modular subsystems;
see footnote 3), then there exists a cost reduction at
which the collaborative effort catches up to the nonco-
operative solution. However, it can easily be shown that
the required relative cost reduction from cooperation
approaches 100% as experimentation costs fall.16 This
generically disqualifies the cost-reduction argument for
collaborative research, at least in environments where
experiments can be conducted at relatively low cost.
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